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ACQUIREMENT OF REAL PROPERTY BY
AMERICAN CHURCHES
The ordinary method by which religious corporations or
trustees for religious societies acquire real estate in the United
States is by deed or will. The deed may be a patent from the
state, or may represent a gift from an individual, or may be an
ordinary business transaction. The will is generally made by
some devout member of the church named as the beneficiary.
These instruments, while they raise many intricate questions of
trusts and charitable uses, and while they are subject to certain
limitations upon religious societies in acquiring real estate, are
construed like other similar instruments and upheld or declared
void accordingly.
But while a deed or will is the ordinary means of devolving
real estate on church organizations, it is by no means the only
one. Congregations all over the country are in actual possession
of property to which they have no record title. Even more often
they hold property under deeds or wills which are void. Fre-
quently expensive improvements have been made on such prop-
erties. To deprive churches of this property would frequently
work great injustice and hardship. Since such possession can-
not be justified under any deed or will, some other legal
principles must be discovered, under which it can be upheld.
This has accordingly been accomplished. In cases where the
church is incorporated and its possession of long duration the
statute of limitations will be used to vest a title in fee in it.
Where, however, the church is unincorporated' or its possession
of too short a duration the statute cannot be applied. To meet
the situation the doctrine of dedication, applicable originally only
where the public as such is interested in a gift, will be extended
to uphold such a possession. The application of these two
doctrines to church affairs has given rise to some interesting
developments, which it will be the purpose of this article to
exhibit.
Adverse Possession.
In one form or another limitation laws will be found in all
highly developed legal systems. They accordingly were made
a part of the English law at an early date, first by judicial
'Stewart v. White, 128 Ala. 202, 30 So. 526, 55 L. R. A. 211.
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legislation, later, by express statutory enactment. They now
form an essential portion of the jurisprudence of every state
in the United States. They have overcome all the prejudice
that judges and attorneys, as well as laymen, have expressed
against them. They are even favored to such an extent that
only a statute, expressly excepting church organizations from its
operation, and leaving no loophole of escape, will prevent its
application to controversies in which a church is a party.2
Since all objections to these statutes have been abandoned,
and since they apply generally in favor of and against individuals
or corporations, it follows that they may be pleaded by3 or
against4 religious organizations and may even be set up in a
suit between two religious corporations.5  Far from being
prejudiced by such a plea, courts will even declare the plea to
be a just, proper, and meritorious defense; as was done in
the remarkable cluster of cases involving the title of Trinity
Church to certain property in New York City.6 These cases on
account of the immense value of the property involved, the
thorough manner in which they were presented to the courts,
and the great care with which they have been decided, deserve a
somewhat more extended statement.
The property in question is situated on Manhattan Island
between the Hudson River and Broadway and north of the
main business section of the city. It was formerly known as
Domine's Bowery and Domine's Hook and comprised about
one hundred and ninety acres. One Annetje Jans appears to
have been its owner in 1663. Her devisees in 1671, with the
exception of one or two, united in a "deed of transport" to
Colonel Lovelace, then governor of New York. Under this deed
the English government took possession. The land thereafter
was successively known as the Duke's Farm, the King's Farm
and the Queen's Farm. In 1075 it was granted to Trinity
Church by a patent which on its face conveyed the entire estate.
Dudley v. Clark, 225 Mo. 570, 164 S. W. 6o8, 613.
8Harpending v. Reformed Dutch Church, 41 U. S. 455, io L. Ed. 1o29.
'Craig v. Franklin County, 58 Me. 479, 497; Propagation Society v.
Sharon, 28 Vt 6o3.
'Second Precinct in Rehoboth v. Carpenter, 23 Pick. 131; Society v.
Bass, 68 N. H. 333, 44 At. 485. See Reformed Church of Gallupville
v. Schoolcraft, 65 N. Y. 134, reversing 5 Lans. 26.
'Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Paige 178, 203; same case, 4 Sandf.
Ch. 633, 734.
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The church went into possession and remained undisturbed till
about 1785, when one of the descendants of Annetje Jans caused
trouble for some years by entering certain parts of the land.
He was however finally persuaded, in consideration of seven
hundred pounds, to relinquish all his claims. The right of the
church to the property was not again disputed till 183o , when
one Bogardus, under the claim that he was a descendant of
one of these heirs of Annetje Jans who had not joined in the
deed of transport, commenced action, claiming a one thirtieth
interest in the land. His theory was, that the church, by the
deed of 1705, had become a tenant in common with the Jans
heir, under whom he claimed. The church as a defense set up
adverse possession since 1705 which plea was upheld in 1833, the
Chancellor saying:
"If a clear, uninterrupted and exclusive possession of
land for one hundred and twenty-five years, under a
grant or conveyance purporting upon its face to be a
valid conveyance of the whole property, is not sufficient
to protect the occupant of the premises, against the claims
of those whose ancestors may have once been owners
of an undivided interest in the same, the titles to lands
in those parts of the state are certainly very unsafe. For
it would, in most cases, be found to be impracticable,
after such a lapse of time, to trace out and establish a
regular chain of title from every person who had once
held an undivided interest in the premises."7
While an appeal from this decision was pending which was
not decided till 1835, when the decision of the chancellor was
affirmed." Another suit was begun in 1834 by one Humbert,
another descendant of Annetje Jans. The plaintiff admitted the
actual possession by the church but claimed that the description
in the deed of 1705 had, through the influence of the church,
been made so ambiguous as to enable the church to fraudulently
appropriate the plaintiff's land under color or pretense of said
deed. This suit was but a fishing expedition to procure evi-
dence for the trial of the Bogardus action. The bill was care-
fully drawn, not so much with reference to what could be
proved, but rather with the purpose of making out "a prima
facie claim, which would compel the defendants to exhibit and
set forth their title deeds and documents, and thus enable the
"Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Paige 178, 203.
'Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 15 Wend. ini.
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complainants to avail themselves of any weak point, which they
might discover in them, from carelessness in the mode of prepar-
ing papers at that distant period, or from the loss or destruction
of some connecting links in the chain of documentary evidence
during so many ages as have elapsed since this title was originally
granted to these defendants."9 A demurrer was interposed by
the church which was sustained both by the chancellor in I83810
and by the Court for the Correction of Errors in 184o.11 In
discussing the statute Cowen, J., pointed out that, if fraud
was allowed to be pleaded as an implied judge-made exception
to the statute, the church would be thrown back on evidence
not merely "obscured by the ordinary mists of tradition in a
settled government, and under a well regulated system of con-
veyancing; but evidence which comes to us through the mutations
of empire, the fury of revolutions, repeated changes in the law
of descent, in the law of common assurances, and great defects
at all times in the method of perpetuating the evidence of their
existence." 12
The attempt to procure evidence against the church by this
subsidiary suit having failed, there was nothing now to do but
to try out the Bogardus action on its merits with what evidence
the plaintiff had on hand. A replication to the plea of the
church was therefore filed, proofs were taken and the cause
was finally brought to a hearing in 1846. The church was not
in a position to prove its adverse possession by living witnesses
farther back than 1870. For the period before that date docu-
mentary evidence more or less valuable was the only evidence
available. Accordingly, old statutes, leases, works of history,
maps, official declarations, pleadings and depositions in old law-
suits were collected in a marvellous mass of immensely persuasive
evidence. Over five hundred leases, covering over one thousand
lots and generally for terms of twenty-one years, were intro-
duced in evidence. It was proved, that some four hundred and
eighty lots had been sold outright by more than one hundred
deeds executed by the church. The court, in holding that such
possession was a proper and just defense in favor of the church
and should be as readily conceded to it, as it would be to anyone
else, said:
'Furman, Senator, in Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. 587, 787.
"'Humbert v. Rexctor of Trinity Church, 7 Paige 195.
'Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. 587.
'Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. 587, 61o.
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"The law on these claims is well settled, and it must be
sustained in favor of religious corporations as well as
private individuals. Indeed, it would be monstrous, if, after
a possession such as has been proved in this case, for a
period of nearly a century and a half, open, notorious,
and within sight of the temple of justice, the successive
claimants, save one, being men of full age, and the courts
open to them all the time (except for seven years of
war and revolution) the title to lands were to be litigated
successfully, upon a claim which has been suspended for
five generations. Few titles in this country would be
secure under such an administration of the law; and its
adoption would lead to scenes of fraud, corruption, foul
justice and legal rapine, far worse in their consequences
upon the peace, good order and happiness of society, than
external war or domestic insurrection." 18
All attempts at mulcting the corporation through a suit brought
by individuals having thus completely failed, an attempt was
made in 1856 to divest the church of its property through an
ejectment suit brought by the state. The plaintiff simply relied
on a presumption that it was prima fade the owner of all land
in the state and proved the possession of the defendant. A
nonsuit, on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish
its title and that, if it had established it, such title was barred
by the statute of limitations, was granted at the trial and upheld
on appeal. With this case all attacks on the property of the
church have come to an end.' 4
In surveying the other cases, in which church property has
been protected by the application of the statute of limitations,
it will be found, that they generally resemble the Trinity Church
Case, not in the length of possession or the value of the property,
but in the fact that there is generally some instrument giving
color of title to the possession. It is elementary that such posses-
sion is more favored than mere naked possession. A person
or corporation taking possession honestly under a void deed is
entitled to more consideration than the mere squatter who simply
appropriates the land. Therefore deeds to a church organization
void because the grantor had no title,'5 or because the purpose
for which the property was bought was not expressed on their
face,'" or because no legislative sanction was obtained as required
'Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. 633, 762.
"'People v. Rector of Trinity Church, 3o Barb. 537, affirmed 22 N. Y. 44.
Taylor v. Public Hall Co., 35 Conn. 430; Second Precinct in Rehoboth
v. Carpenter, 23 Pick. 13i.
Gump v. Sibley, 79 Md. 165, 28 AtI. 977.
39
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by the bill of rights,1 7 or because the grantee at the time was
unincorporated, 8 or because the grantor, a married women, was
not subjected to private examination," or because a necessary
party had not been joined,20 or because the value of the land
was greater,21 or the quantum of it larger than the church, by
its charter, was permitted to acquire,22 have served as founda-
tions for an adverse possession by church corporations and have
become important in their chain of title. It follows that a church
may acquire by adverse possession more land23 or land of greater
value than the law, under which it exists, permits. The restric-
tion imposed on the corporation is in no way the concern of any
private individual but rather a question of governmental policy,
with which individuals have nothing to do.
24  The title thus
acquired is perfectly good as to the whole world except the
state, and as to the state itself not void but only voidable at its
option.
2 5
But while a written instrument is thus of great importance,
it is not absolutely necessary. Title by adverse possession may
be acquired without it. A church corporation, like any other
individual or corporation, may simply take possession of property
and such possession, if maintained for the requisite time, will
be protected by the statute of limitations, to the extent of the
substantial and actual. inclosure.28  A church corporation char-
tered in 1852, which merely takes possession of the property
of a moribund congregation, and holds it for forty years, can
therefore not be dislodged by persons claiming to represent
the old corporation. 27  The title acquired by such adverse pos-
'T Zion Church v. Hilken, 84 Md. 170, 35 Atl. 9; Regents of the Uni-
versity of Maryland v. Trustees of Calvary Church, 104 Md. 635, 65 Atl.
398; Dickerson v. Kirk, io5 Md. 638; Mills v. Zion Chapel, i19 Md. 51o,
87 At. 257.
"Reforned Church of Gallupville v. Schoolcraft, 65 N. Y. I34, reversing
5 Lans. 2o6.
'Deepwater Railroad Co. v. Hanaker, 66 S. E. (W. Va.) lO4.
"Brown v. Nye, 12 Mass. 285.
'Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. 587, 629; Bogardus v. Trinity
Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. 633, 657; Harpending v. The Dutch Church, 16
Pet. 492. In this last case the instrument was a will, not a deed.
Dangerfield v. Williams, 26 App. D. C. 508.
'Dangerfield v. Williams, supra.
Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. 633, 758.
'Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. 587, 63o.
"Harpending v. Dutch Church, 16 Pet. 455, 493.
'First Presbyterian Society v. Bass, 68 N. H. 333, 44 At. 485.
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session is so perfect that a quit claim deed given by the former
owner is of no significance and will not be accepted in evidence. 28
Since church corporations can thus acquire property by adverse
possession, it becomes important to know just what, in the case
of churches, will be considered as adverse possession. Clearly
the use for twenty-nine years by a seceded minority of a con-
gregation of its church building under its leave and license is
not adverse, and hence cannot form even the inception of a
title.20 To be effective as a bar, such possession must be
exclusive of the original owner, continuous as to time, and
under a claim of right. The incidents of such possession will
depend upon the nature of the property. Acts sufficient to con-
stitute adverse possession of an empty lot will be insufficient,
where a business block is in question. In regard to a church
building its continuous control and use by the officers of the
congregation for the purposes of public worship, will be treated
as an actual possession as much as if they actually resided on
the premises3" and such possession may even extend to adjoining
uninclosed and vacant land.31
The most interesting and important application of the doctrine
of adverse possession, however, is in regard to trusts. Church
property is generally quite well encumbered with uses. Where
the original grantors have not created express trusts, courts have
come to the rescue with the doctrine of implied trusts. Many
states have gone so far as to attach a trust to all property
acquired by religious associations. These trusts have sometimes
proved to be a burden rather than a benefit. Instead of pro-
tecting the congregation they have prevented its growth. Some
relief has been found by applying the statute of limitations for
the purpose of eliminating such trusts. While it has been held,
that a church trustee cannot hold adversely to the church,3 2
except where he has unequivocably repudiated the trust;33 it
is quite well established that the congregation may hold adversely
Bose v. Christ, 193 Pa. 13, 44 AtI. 240.
"Landis Appeal, iO Pa. 467. See Stewart v. White, 128 Ala. 202, 30
So. 526, 55 L. R. A. 21i.
' Macon v. Shepard, 2i Tenn. 334; Randolph v. Meek, 8 Tenn. 58.
' Mather v. Ministers of Trinity Church, 3 S. & R 509; Second
Methodist Episcopal Church v. Humphrey, 66 Hun 628, 21 N. Y. Supp. 89.
' Krauczunas v. Hoban, 221 Pa. 213, 70 AtI. 740; Ebbinghaus v. Killian,
i Mackey 247.
u Church v. Newington, 53 N. H. 595.
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to the trustee where the latter is a mere dry trustee without
any actual power or duty. 4
But the cases do not stop here. A religious society may
acquire absolute possession and title of the property, which
has come to it encumbered by a trust, by defiantly diverting it
to a different use or appropriating it to a different religious
community. 5 This possession, during the period of limitation,
will of course be a precarious one, subject to be disturbed at
any time, by an action to enforce the trust. But after the period
of limitation has expired under these circumstances adverse
possession will create a new title, stripped of the trust and fully
marketable, so that specific performance of a contract, to take
a mortgage on the same may be obtained. 8
However, to make such a possession adverse, the acts and
declarations of the church must unambiguously show an inten-
tion to hold the property hostile to and clear of such trust.
A declaration in the articles of incorporation of a congregation
that all property of the church is vested in the corporation with
full power of the latter to sell, convey, or otherwise dispose of
it, will be sufficient for this purpose and will, after the necessary
time has elapsed, fully clear the title.37 A vote of a congregation
declaring that henceforth their property shall be held for a
purpose inconsistent with a presbyterian use, and that any trust
for that purpose is hereby denied and repudiated, followed by
an undisturbed possession of sixty years, will accomplish the
same result.88 Where property is held by trustees in trust for
a religious society, such trust may even be eliminated, by an
absolute deed from the trustees to the society, followed by twenty
years possession. 9
But the statute of limitations will not be sufficient in all cases
to accomplish the desired result. The possession may have been
for a period shorter than that prescribed by the statute. Or
the church may be unincorporated and hence incapable of taking
the presumptivd grant on which the doctrine of adverse pos-
"Dees v. Moss Point Baptist Church, 17 So. (Miss.) I; First Baptist
Church of Sharon v. Harper, 191 Mass. 196, 77 N. E. 778. See also.
Dudley v. Clark, 164 S. W. 6o8.
' Burrows v. Holt, 2o -Conn. 459, 465.
"Rother v. Sharp St. Station, 85 Md. 528.
" Sharp St. Station v. Rother, 83 Md. 289, 85 Md. 528, 530.
'Attorney Gelneral v. Federal Street Meeting House, 69 Md. i, 62.
"Pine Street Congregational Society v. Weld, 78 Mass. 570.
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session rests. In either case the statute will not apply. There-
fore the United States Supreme Court in a leading case, in
which the possession of the church had been continued for some
sixty years, refused to put its decision on the ground of adverse
possession, saying: "Nor can any presumption of grant arise
from the subsequent lapse of time; since there never has been
any such incorporated Lutheran church capable of taking the
donation.14 0  Yet the court would not allow the property of
be taken away from the church. It extended the doctrine of
dedication to cover the case and thus secured to the church the
full enjoyment of the property, while leaving the legal title
and possibly a contingent remainder in the original owner. This
brings us to the second part of this article.
Dedication.
Originally the doctrine of dedication was confined to property
used by the public as a street. A person, who allowed his land
to be used for a street, was not permitted to reclaim it from
such public use at his pleasure. Later by analogy the doctrine
was extended to public squares, public cemeteries, public school
grounds and the like.4 1  Its extension to property devoted to
church purposes in England, where there is an established
church, which is as much a part of the machinery of govern-
ment as townships, cities, and counties are with us, was not
unnatural. In all these cases the purpose was a strictly public
one. Public, municipal or ecclesiastical officers would assume
such control over the property as was called for by the cir-
cumstances. When we come to America, however, after the
early church establishments had been swept away, a different
situation is presented. Church purposes in the United States
are strictly private purposes.42 They are, of course, of more
than passing interest to the general public. In a modified sense,
they may even be called public purposes. Says the Missouri
court in a dedication case: "It is presumed that in the nineteenth
century, in a Christian land, no argument is necessary to show
that church purposes are public purposes. . . . To deny
that church purposes are public purposes, is to argue that the
'Beatty v. KurtZ, 2 Pet. 566, 582.
"Sturner v. County Court, 42 W. Va. 724, 730, 26 S. E. 532, 36 L. R. A.
300.
, Liondais v. Municipality No. 2, 5 La. Ann. 9.
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maintenance, support and propagation of the Christian religion
is not a matter of public concern. Our laws, although they
recognize no particular religious establishment, are not insen-
sible to the advantages of Christianity, and extend their protec-
tion to all in that faith and mode of worship."43  Though
therefor the beneficiaries in the case of a verbal gift of land
to an American church are limited and though there is no public
officer to manage the property thus donated, the doctrine of
dedication has been extended to such a case.
44
This doctrine is put on the ground of estoppel. It is obviously
unfair that a person, who has allowed his property to be used
and improved by a congregation, should be allowed to assume
control of it at his pleasure. It makes no difference just how
this permission has been given. "A dedication may be made
without writing; by acts in pais as well as by deed. It is not
at all necessary that the owner should part with the title which
he has; for dedication has respect to the possession, and not
the permanent estate. Its effect is not to deprive a party of title
to his land but to estop him, while the dedication continues in
force, from asserting that right of exclusive possession and
enjoyment which the owner of property ordinarily has. The
principle upon which estoppel rests is, that it would be dis-
honest, immoral and indecent, and in some instances sacri-
legious, to reclaim at pleasure property which has been solemnly
devoted to the use of the public, or in furtherance of some
charitable or pious object. The law therefore will not permit
any one thus to break his own plighted faith; to disappoint
honest expectations thus excited, and upon which reliance has
been placed. The principle is one of sound morals, and of most
obvious equity, and is in the strictest sense a part of the law
of the land."
45
But the mere appropriation by an owner of his land to the
uses of a church is not sufficient to constitute a dedication. A
manufacturing company which builds a city and as part of it
a church for the use of its working men, but which retains full
control over the property, will not be deemed to have effected
a dedication. 6 The king of Spain, who acquires property and
' Hannibal v. Draper, i5 Mo. 634, 639.
"Benn v. Hatcher, 8i Va. 25, 29.
"Hunter v. Sandy Hill, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 407, 411, 412. See Bennz v.
Hatcher, 81 Va. 25, 29.
"Attorney General v. Merrimac Manufacturing Co., 8o Mass. 586.
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builds a church in 1792 out of the funds in the royal chest, and
who thereafter manages the property and sells it in 18o7 to a
private purchaser, will be deemed to have conveyed a complete
title to the purchaser.4 7 Something more than a mere appropria-
tion to church purposes is therefore necessary. There must be
an unequivocal act of donation, which shows an intent of the
owner to divest himself to some extent of the ownership or
power of control over his property and to vest an independent
interest in some other person or body. Such intention may
appear from a writing with or without seal, or from a plat
or may rest in whole or part on parol declarations.
Probably the most persuasive evidence of an intention of a
donor to dedicate property to religious purposes will be afforded
by a plat. It is elementary that streets marked on such a plat
are dedicated to the public. There is no reason, since the doc-
trine of dedication has been extended to churches, why the same
rule should not apply where some particular lot is marked so as
to indicate clearly an intention to devote it to some church
purpose. Thus in the leading case of Beatty v. Kurtz
4 a plat
made in 1769 had one lot marked "for the Lutheran church."
The church, an unincorporated body too weak to maintain a
minister, built a block schoolhouse on the lot, which was used
occasionally for public worship. It also used the lot as a ceme-
tery. The maker of the plat had repeatedly declared his will-
ingness to give a deed to the congregation, but none in fact
was ever executed. After his death his heirs claimed the lot.
The Supreme Court of the United States however sustained an
injunction issued against them on the ground that by the plat
and the subsequent declarations of the owner the lot was clearly
dedicated to religious purposes and could not be reclaimed.
Similarly lots in a plat crossed with red lines and marked "church
grounds" while on the margin of the plat was a notation that
these lots were "intended for church grounds" have been held
to be dedicated to public worship.
49
'T Antoner v. Eslavas Heirs, 9 Port. (Ala.) 527.
482 Pet. 566.
"Hannibal v. Draper, 15 Mo. 634. See also Lavalle v. Strobel, 89 Ill.
370, 382, and St. Paul's Church v. East St. Louis, 245 Ill. 470, in which
inscriptions, "English Graveyard" and "English Church," on six lots
in a plat, were held sufficient, to prove a donation of these lots to the
English-speaking inhabitants of the locality. In Louisiana a flat con-
taining a large square marked "Place de l'annunciation" on which the
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But plats are not the only instruments which may serve as a
foundation for a dedication. Deeds, though invalid for one
reason or another, may be clear evidence of an intention to dedi-
cate property to religious purposes. Deeds, void because the
grantor, a married woman, had not been subjected to privy exam-
ination" or because the grantee, a religious society, was unin-
corporated 51 may therefor be effective as showing an intention
to donate the property for religious purposes, and as estopping
the owner from reclaiming it. Such a dedication may even
attach to an absolute deed to individuals, where the considera-
tion for the deed is raised by voluntary subscriptions, the under-
standing all the time being that the church was to be the
beneficiary.
52
Nor is even an instrument under seal necessary for this pur-
pose. An ordinary written contract may be fully sufficient
to establish a dedication. Thus a subscription paper subscribed
by a number of contributors, one of whom. donated a piece
of land, on which to build the church, while the others donated
money with which to build it, will be effective to prove a dedi-
cation of the land in question.
53
In all the cases so far considered there has been a writing of
some kind. This, however, is not necessary. A dedication for
the use and benefit of a religious society may be made wholly
by parol.54 An owner of land who represents to a congregation
that he will donate the land, provided they build a church on it,
will therefore, after the church is built, not be permitted to
reclaim the land, though no deed nor written contract of any kind
has been executed. 55
plan of a church clearly appeared, which plan was marked "Eclise de
l'annunciation," has been held not to create a dedication, either because
the purpose was not a public one, Liondais v. Municipality No. 2, 5 La.
Ann. 9, or because the dedication had not been accepted, Xiques v.
Bujac, 7 La. Ann. 498. The question before the Louisiana court was,
whether the property should be used as a common or should be divided
into building lots by the heirs of the person, who had executed the plat.
' Deepwater Railroad Co. v. Honaker, 66 W. Va. 136, 27 L. R. A. 388,
66 S. E. io4.
"1 Callson v. Hope, 75 Fed. 758.
"2McKinney v. Griggs, 68 Ky. 4o, 96 Ann. Dec. 36o.
'Baptist Church v. Presbyterian Church, 57 Ky. 635.
"Hollar v. Harne.y, 4 Ky. Law Rep. 988; McKinney v. Griggs, 68 Ky.
401, 405, 96 Am. Dec. 36o.
'Atkinson v. Bell, i8 Tex. 474.
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The question whether an acceptance of a dedication is neces-
sary has given rise to a conflict in the authorities. The necessity
of such acceptance has been denied by the Missouri court and
affirmed by the Louisiana court, both in cases involving a dedica-
tion by designation on a plat." Since all the cases on dedication
lay great stress on the subsequent possession of the beneficiaries
and many of these cases put their decision directly on the ground
of estoppel, there can be no doubt that the decision of the
Louisiana court is the correct solution of the difficulty. With-
out an acceptance of the dedication it is impossible to apply the
doctrine of estoppel to the situation. It is not unfair that a
dedicator should repossess himself of the property which he has
vainly offered as a gift. The beneficiaries must at least have
accepted the gift before they can have any equity as against him.
It follows that even where a dedication was accepted for a time
and then rejected, the full property rights revest in the dedi-
cator, unless the rejection has been by only part of the bene-
ficiaries. Thus where property is dedicated to all religious
societies of the locality and four of these societies build churches
of their own and cease to use the dedicated property, they will
be treated as having renounced all their rights in it and such
implied renunciation will be as effective as if it had been
expressed in the most solemn form. *
What is the proper remedy in case of disturbance of dedicated
property? It has been held that, while an express trust excludes
a dedication 8 a dedication may create a charitable trust.5
9 There
is at any rate a strong resemblance between a dedication and a
trust in the separation of the legal and equitable title that results
under both. 0 Judges therefore sometimes use the word dedica-
tion in speaking of trusts and the word trust in speaking of
dedication. The situation in the two cases being so similar and
the estoppel in dedication being an equitable estoppel, it follows
that the most appropriate remedy is by an injunction or by
other equitable relief. Such accordingly has been the form in
which these actions have come before the various courts begin-
ning with the case of Beatty v. Kurtz."1 Says Story, J., in this
"Xiques v. Bujac, 7 La. Ann. 498; Hannibal v. Draper, I5 Mo. 634.
"Baptist Church of Lancaster v. Presbyterian Church, 57 Ky. 635.
'Price v. Methodist Church, 4 Ohio 514, 545.
"' Curd v. Wallace, 37 Ky. (7 Dana) 190, 3o Am. Dec. 85.
'Hainlin v. Webster, 76 Ad. (Me.) 163; Beaver v. Filson, 8 Pa. 327;
Ludlow v. St. $ohn's Church, 124 N. Y. Supp. 75.
O2 Pet. 566.
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case: "The remedy must be sought, if at all, in the protecting
power of a court of chancery, operating by its injunction to
preserve the repose of the ashes of the dead and the religious
sensibilities of the living."
Summing up, the ordinary way in which church organizations
in the United States acquire real estate is by deed or will. Where
these fail, either because they are void, or wholly non-existent,
the possession of property by a congregation will nevertheless
be upheld, if it rests on any meritorious ground whatsoever.
In case the congregation is incorporated and has been in pos-
session sufficiently long, the right of the original owner will
be held to be barred by adverse possession and the church
corporation will be vested with the full title. On the other hand,
where the church is unincorporated or its possession has been too
short for the purposes of the statute, the original owner, if he
has in any manner evinced an intention to donate the property,
will, by such acts of dedication, he held estopped to dispute the
possession of the church. He will, however, retain the legal
title and even a contingent remainder in the equitable title.
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